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A Cartel in the Public Interest:
NCAA Broadcast Policy During
the Early Cold War
Jeffrey Montez de Oca
 In 1951, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) began regu-
lating college football broadcasting on television with the claim that regulations 
served the public interest. The establishment of broadcast regulations transformed 
the NCAA from a confederation of semi-autonomous institutions into a powerful 
governing and policing body that controlled college athletics. Broadcast regula-
tions further transformed the NCAA into a cartel that fixed the value of football 
broadcasts by limiting supply in order to gain monopoly profits.1 Claiming that 
regulations served the public interest enabled the NCAA’s restraint of trade by 
shielding it from a possible U.S. Supreme Court “rule of reason” test. 
 Situating the 1951 creation of broadcast regulations within a broader history 
of the NCAA during the twentieth century demonstrates how transformations in 
the economy are dialectically tied to cultural formations. Comparing the NCAA’s 
strategies of action in the 1950s to 1905 when the NCAA was established and 
to 1984 when the U.S. Supreme Court deregulated college football broadcast-
ing highlights continuities and contradictions in U.S. liberalism. Economic and 
cultural conditions of the 1950s, which made cartelization a possibility for the 
NCAA, did not exist in either 1905 or 1984. Strategies of action in commercial 
sport must be consistent with existing market conditions and available technolo-
gies. At the same time, the choices made by social actors are not simply deter-
mined by impersonal economic and technological forces.2 The NCAA was not 
only responsive to market conditions, but also guided by prevailing systems of 
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thought in each period, specifically the social construction of reason.3 Compar-
ing these three periods show how determinations of reason as well as economic 
practices in 1905, 1951, and 1984 were responsive to broader trends within U.S. 
society.
 Football historian Ronald Smith (2001) states that the first priority of any 
institution is survival and then prosperity.4 While this is essentially true, capi-
talism’s competitive environment forces institutions to strive for prosperity in 
order to survive. This article shows how the NCAA charted different strategies 
of action to achieve prosperity as U.S. capitalism shifted from progressive era 
Corporate Liberalism to Postwar Fordism to Neoliberalism. The article begins 
in the Progressive Era with an outline of the NCAA’s establishment in 1905. The 
next section details at length how the NCAA used the conditions of the early Cold 
War and constructions of masculinity to establish its broadcast regulations. The 
last section analyzes the construction of reason in the 1984 National Collegiate 
Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma decision 
that ended NCAA broadcast regulations and contextualizes the decision in the 
emergence of Neoliberalism.5 In each period, the balance of authority between 
colleges and the NCAA shifted up and back but the quest for prosperity remained 
constant. Another constant was the use of reformist rhetoric to legitimate a greater 
centralization of power and wealth in increasingly large institutions. 
Corporate Liberalism and the Founding of the NCAA
 Higher educational institutions formed the NCAA in 1905 in response to 
widespread condemnation of college football’s brutality and scandals. The im-
petus to create the NCAA grew out of conditions of the 1890s.6 To understand 
those conditions, we need to step back a few years. Young men began playing 
ball games on the campuses of northeastern colleges in the 1860s. The game 
of American football developed during the 1870s and 1880s. By the 1890s, the 
game had become very popular and spread to every region of the United States.7 
With popularity came profitability and scandal. The progressive press reacted to 
cheating and violence that was perceived as rife in the game.8 Criticism of the 
excesses in college football created the conditions in which the NCAA could 
arise.
 A group of schools that participated in a high level of intercollegiate football 
competition created the NCAA. Most, if not all, were motivated by financial and 
institutional interests. As a result, they designed the NCAA as a representative 
organization to reform the game and quell calls to ban it.9 In reforming football, 
NCAA member institutions had no desire to give up institutional control over 
their teams, high-level competition, or profitability. In fact, schools retained a 
high degree of individual autonomy in order to compete aggressively with other 
schools on and off the field.10 The NCAA constitution preserved institutional 
autonomy through the doctrine of Home Rule, which allowed schools to deter-
mine “eligibility rules, coaching salaries, stadium building, ticket sales, and, had 
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they been in existence, radio and television contracts.”11 Football historian John 
Watterson (2000) claims the creation of the NCAA, like other progressive era 
reforms, insulated an institution from attacks by the state, the media, or citizen 
groups while preparing it for economic growth.12 
 Forming the NCAA produced what Gabriel Kolko (1963) calls market 
rationalization.13 Leading football competitors organized themselves to reform 
an unstable market in order to insure future economic growth and to protect 
themselves from potential political attacks coming from either the state or 
civil society.14 This formation of corporatism within college football is typical 
of progressive era Corporate Liberalism.15 The late-nineteenth century saw a 
dismantling of the “free market” and a new regulatory role of the government. 
Central to the thesis of Corporate Liberalism is an acceptance by the government 
and public of greater market controls and centralization of power. Corporatism 
would ensure the growth of large corporations in a stable economic environment 
that fostered capital accumulation.16 As evidenced by the doctrine of Home Rule, 
the Progressive Era did not give birth to a fully regulated society, but rather 
provided the necessary first step of forming alliances between the state and the 
corporate sector through “progressive” reform.17 Indeed, college football enjoyed 
tremendous growth and prosperity from the 1890s through the late-twentieth 
century despite slumps during the World Wars.18 
 As college football became more lucrative, remaining competitive grew 
more costly. Some of the basic costs for producing a winning team in the early 
twentieth century included full-time professional coaches that were often better 
paid than most faculty and some university presidents; fleets of scouts, and a 
feeder system to bring top “football material” (i.e. student-athletes) to campus; 
and both indirect and sometimes direct compensation for athletes.19 Whether it 
was an attempt to appease growing student demand for comfortable seating or 
a strategy to manage student behavior in controlled campus settings, building 
enormous concrete stadiums provided ever-greater revenue from gate receipts. 
As a result, stadiums grew in size during the twentieth century, as did the cost 
of college football.20 Schools ultimately became dependent upon stadium-based 
revenues21 if for no other reason than to pay down debt on the stadiums.22
 Market rationalization through the creation of the NCAA supported the 
formation of a tier of elite teams that dominated on-field competition. As the cost 
of fielding competitive teams soared in the twentieth century, generating revenue 
through winning became increasingly important. Schools in less significant mar-
kets that lacked large stadiums, especially smaller schools, were at a structural 
disadvantage when it came to purchasing football’s forces of production.23 At the 
same time, large schools, especially in affluent markets, generated more revenue 
to invest in maintaining dominance than smaller schools.24 By mid-century, a 
profitable group of elite football schools had formed. This elite group was com-
posed mostly of public universities like Michigan, Oklahoma, and California as 
well as some private universities such as the University of Pennsylvania, Notre 
Dame, and the University of Southern California. Many smaller schools were 
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forced out of the football market by the cost of competition.25 Even the “Ivy 
League” that had created high-pressure athletics in the nineteenth century “de-
emphasized” football as a cost-savings and a publicity strategy when they could 
no longer compete with the top schools.26 In short, the early twentieth century 
saw power steadily centralize in ever-larger football programs.
 The NCAA itself began to grasp power in the mid-1940s despite the con-
stitutional constraint of Home Rule. The NCAA quadrupled its dues in 1948 
to $100.27 This increased the NCAA’s finances and confidence when added to 
revenues received from its basketball tournament and the sale of its rulebooks.28 
The doctrine of Home Rule, however, remained an institutional barrier to its 
consolidation of power. The NCAA made its first attack upon Home Rule with 
the establishment of the Sanity Code that attempted to regulate and to police the 
recruiting of and the subsidies given to athletes.29 Adopted in 1948, the Sanity 
Code allowed the NCAA to expel schools that did not conform to its standards. 
Economist Andrew Zimbalist argues that the Sanity Code initiated the NCAA’s 
process of cartelization where colleges colluded to limit compensation given 
to the athletes, driving the cost of athletes’ labor below the value of their labor 
power—impossible in an unregulated market.30 However, the Sanity Code failed 
because it limited schools’ ability to pursue competitive advantage over other 
football programs. As a result, a group of schools known as “the Sinful Seven” 
rebelled, and by January of 1951 the Sanity Code was abandoned.31 Despite the 
setback, the Sanity Code was a harbinger of greater centralization and regulation 
that television broadcasting would make possible.
 The failure of the Sanity Code demonstrates limits on the trend towards 
market rationalization. U.S. universities exist in a competitive market environ-
ment. Participating in competitive athletics provides financial capital and publicity 
for competing in that market.32 The Sanity Code attempted to use calls in civil 
society for the reform of college football to legitimate increased market regula-
tion.33 It impeded, however the ability of leading football schools to compete in 
the football market and accrue capital. This suggests that desire for reform in 
civil society alone cannot sustain market rationalization without the promise of 
stable capital accumulation for competing institutions. The establishment of the 
NCAA in 1905 also suggests that regulations address broader cultural conditions 
to insulate institutions from political attacks.34 In other words, market regulations 
must address the cultural and political interests of civil society at the same time 
as the economic interests of capital. 
The Television Age and the New National
Collegiate Athletic Association
 The advent of television in the late 1940s created an opportunity for cartel-
ization far beyond that of the Sanity Code. To understand how television created 
this opportunity, we need to look at the conditions engendered by television. 
Televising sports got off to a slow start in the United States on May 17, 1939 when 
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NBC broadcasted a Princeton-Columbia baseball game.35 Newspaper reviews 
were critical of television’s inability to reproduce large, sport spectacles since 
the coverage lacked sophisticated broadcast techniques and technology. With a 
single camera fixed near third base, coverage was fractured and discontinuous. 
The handful of viewers in Manhattan that saw the broadcast found it a disorient-
ing and disappointing experience.36 
 Despite poor reviews in 1939 and the suppression of television’s development 
during the second world war, the television age was coming. The University of 
Pennsylvania (Penn) invested in and experimented with football broadcasting 
throughout the 1940s.37 After World War II regional networks were established38 
and vast improvements were made in the techniques for broadcasting mass sport 
spectacles.39 With improvements, football broadcasting looked like a great source 
of publicity to top football schools like Penn. Beginning in the late-1940s, the 
sales of television sets grew exponentially going from 7,000 sets in 1946 to 1 
million in 1948 to 3 million in 1949. By 1954, over 35 million television sets 
had been sold.40 With greater access to television and improvements in broadcast 
technology, the popularity of sports broadcasting surged. As early as 1947, cafes 
in Pasadena charged $20 for seats next to a television set and $10 for standing 
room to watch a local broadcast of the Rose Bowl.41 Fan appreciation of televised 
games was so significant that a 1948 NCAA survey in the Boston-New York-
Philadelphia corridor found that 80 percent of fans preferred televised games to 
live performances.42
 The rapid expansion of television sets in the Northeast and Midwest coupled 
with surveys indicating fan appreciation of televised games triggered extreme 
reactions to the quickly approaching television age. Network executives viewed 
the future through rose tinted glasses. Robert Sandeck, vice president of ABC, 
wrote in 1950, “[W]e’ll have silent football. . . . It will be played indoors under 
perfect conditions. The weather will always be just right, the grass just the proper 
height, the ball will never be slippery. In this test-tube football, the players won’t 
be bothered by the roar of the crowd, because the crowds will be watching at 
home, and they’ll be comfortable. There’ll be no one at the game except the 
sponsor—and he’ll be behind a glass cage.”43 Sandeck’s enthusiasm for sterile 
purity probably owes more to postwar enthusiasm for social engineering and 
scientific futurism than to fans’ actual desire to evacuate stadiums.
 Administrators of football programs struggling to survive on gate receipts 
saw the potential loss of attendance caused by television as a technological threat 
akin to an alien attack from outer space. Whereas Sandeck gleefully imagined a 
new business model of controlled corporate sponsorship with fans comfortably 
ensconced at home, many athletic directors felt imperiled. As Asa Bushnell, 
Commissioner of the Eastern College Athletic Conference (ECAC), stated to the 
first annual ECAC meeting in 1947, “television is the scientific method which 
has been developed to consign all athletic directors to the Smithsonian Institute 
and to make football stadiums of interest only to archeologists.”44 While holding 
contrary positions on broadcasting itself, Sandeck and Bushnell did agree that 
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television had the potential to transform the business model of college athletics 
and profoundly affect U.S. society. Implicit in these statements was also a larger 
concern over control of college football broadcasting and its revenues.
 Critics of football broadcasting gained ammunition in 1950 when gate re-
ceipts fell into a nationwide decline.45 Live attendance had increased every year 
following a slump during World War II, and in 1949 ticket sales reached a record 
high. The 1950 season then saw a surge in television broadcasts. Schools like 
Michigan, Notre Dame, and Penn were free to aggressively pursue commercial 
broadcasting with the networks in an open market. Fear of television was then 
fanned by a NCAA-sponsored study done by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) that found areas broadcasting games had a 4 percent drop in gate 
receipts whereas areas without broadcasting rose 4 percent in 1950.46 Though 
certainly not conclusive, NCAA members saw this pattern as sufficient reason 
to take action.47 
 The television age created new conditions that made old practices appear 
obsolete to many within the NCAA. The doctrine of Home Rule that previously 
ensured the tradition of institutional autonomy now limited television revenues 
to schools that could negotiate broadcast rights with the networks. This disadvan-
taged not only small schools but also large schools in small markets. For instance, 
Penn and Notre Dame could negotiate lucrative contracts with the networks in 
1950, but Oklahoma, a dominant football program during the 1950s under its 
coach Charles “Bud” Wilkinson,48 could not.49 
 Fear of television’s impact on gate receipts provoked a variety of attempts to 
stave off losses at the gate. Several regional conferences such as the Big Ten and 
the Big Seven blocked live broadcasts and forced delayed broadcasts of games 
in 1950. However, popular desire for live coverage led to threats of legislative 
acts blocking the widespread use of delayed broadcast.50 Another strategy was 
theater television—a live broadcast piped to a theater charging admission.51 The 
University of Michigan experimented with closed circuit broadcasts in movie 
houses in 1950, as did Illinois and Northwestern,52 not only to slow the erosion of 
stadium and movie theater attendance, but also to recreate the gridiron spectacle. 
A Newsweek article described the presentation of a Michigan-Indiana game: “As 
at Ann Arbor there were cheerleaders, a band, hot-dog and pop vendors. The dif-
ference was that the movie crowd—for 80 cents—saw the game, plus a feature 
movie and a stage show.”53 The NCAA also hoped that pay-per-view systems 
such as skiatron and phonovision would take hold.54 Both theater television 
and pay-per-view followed the older ticket-sales model, and neither provided a 
sufficiently robust economic model.55 The television age had created new social 
and economic conditions and it demanded a new economic model.
Football Broadcasting and Cold War Fear
 Between the unstable 1950 football market and the attempts by schools to 
impose stability, television had created the conditions for a larger institution to 
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provide order through market rationalization. The NCAA as an umbrella orga-
nization proved to be the best instrument to rationalize the market, which was 
a primary reason for its creation. The consolidation of broadcast power by the 
NCAA, however was certain to raise antitrust concerns. As a result, the NCAA 
acted conscious of a possible Supreme Court “rule of reason” test.56 Under 
prevailing interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court could allow 
a restraint of trade if it were deemed reasonable—that is if a restraint fostered 
stable capital accumulation.57 Therefore, the NCAA constructed its broadcast 
regulations with this in mind. The NCAA used the conditions of the early Cold 
War (1947-1964) as a prism for the state and civil society to view collegiate 
athletics and television broadcasting in order to sell its regulations as reasonable 
in the 1950s. 
 The early Cold War engendered great anxiety in U.S. society. Three par-
ticularly relevant sources are: technology, centralization, and conflict. Nuclear 
annihilation was certainly a primary technological threat that hovered over the 
entire Cold War.58 But the early 1950s saw a welter of new technologies invading 
postwar homes that made nuclear warfare only the most glaring and dramatic 
source of technological anxiety. Prominent in the technological invasion of post-
war homes was television. Television historian Lynn Spigel argues many people 
in the early 1950s experienced television as an alien force that transformed the 
social space of their homes. Debates over television’s impact on the home, Spigel 
contends, refracted a broader anxiety that modern technological society had an 
effeminizing effect upon men.59
 As three major television networks began to stretch across the United States,60 
sociologist C. Wright Mills lamented changes in the United States during the 
twentieth century that led to the rise of a “power elite.” Mills saw the centraliza-
tion of power and wealth in three massive institutions (the military, the federal 
government, and the economy) as producing the “higher circles of power” that 
controlled postwar U.S. society, and ultimately formed what Eisenhower named 
the “military-industrial complex.”61 Mills’ critique of mass society joined a chorus 
of critics warning against the rise of giant institutions that dominated all aspects 
of social life and that left “the little guy” vulnerable to external control. Historian 
James Gilbert (2005) argues mass society critiques expressed and provided a 
means for working out changing gender relations during the postwar period of 
which the critiques of television, mentioned above, were a part.
 Fear of invasion and vulnerability were made most palpable by the United 
State’s conflict with the Soviet Union. The openness of liberal society evoked 
fears of a communist invasion that would penetrate deep into the heart of America. 
In an example of “patriotic pageantry,” the residents of Mosinee, Wisconsin 
staged a one-day take over of their own town in 1950 to dramatize the dangers 
of global communism.62 Similarly, the popularity of science fiction films like It 
Came from Outer Space (1953) expressed a fear of Soviet invasion and nuclear 
technology.63 George Kennan, the architect of cold war foreign policy, was keenly 
aware of the period’s climate of anxiety.64 In the “Long Telegram” that outlined 
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the strategy of containment, Costigliola argues that Kennan described the Soviet 
leadership as, “engaging in the driving, aggressive behavior conventionally as-
sociated with masculinity.” And he repeated “the word ‘penetration’ five times 
in reference to the Soviet’s insistent, unwanted intrusion.”65 Cold war historians 
argue the culture of containment transcended all aspects of cold war society in 
the 1950s.66 Cold war anxiety allowed reactionaries to equate homosexuality to 
a soft, deviant masculinity open to communist penetration to justify anti-gay 
repression, such as purging homosexuals from government positions.67 Indeed, 
fear of invasion and vulnerability was the very basis of the strategy of contain-
ment that guided foreign policy throughout the Cold War.68
 The strategy of containment was a two-pronged plan of attack for fighting 
the Cold War.69 The first prong attempted to contain the Soviet Union to limited 
spheres of influence through military force.70 This prong led to the arms race 
and the establishment of the military-industrial complex. The very technologi-
cal nature of Cold War weaponry helped to further centralize power in large 
institutions.71 The second prong or “cultural Cold War” attempted to win the 
hearts and minds of people throughout the world with cultural and economic 
development.72 The United States waged the cultural Cold War by forming the 
“Free World” as a system of trading alliances led by the U.S. and buttressed by 
a pluralistic image of the “American way of life.”73 
 The “American way of life” described a lifestyle associated with postwar 
prosperity and was based on a notion of the good life promised by U.S. liberal-
ism. It also included practices and beliefs that countered the “slave world” of 
the Kremlin. Suburban homes stocked with a wealth of consumer goods and 
located in ethnically integrated neighborhoods became symbolic of the Ameri-
can way of life.74 Richard Nixon equated the good life with consumerism when 
he argued that a modern home stocked with labor saving devices symbolized 
capitalism’s greater ability to provide for its people during the kitchen debate 
with Nikita Khrushchev.75 The nuclear family and suburban home emerged as 
central to citizenship and identity during the early Cold War despite also being 
sites of isolation and anxiety.76 Leisure activities, and especially sports, were a 
major part of this consumerist lifestyle. From the Olympics to college football 
to little league baseball, sports participation and consumption were central to 
the American way of life and hence patriotic.77 Further, leisure activities like 
watching football were “just reward” for men who submitted to the alienating 
environments of large corporations in order to pay for their suburban homes and 
technological comforts. This is why in the 1950s sociologists like Mills, Wil-
liam Whyte, and David Riesman saw the suburbs as extensions of the corporate 
world.78
 Addressing cold war anxieties was central to how the NCAA framed its 
regulations. Positioning the regulations as furthering institutional interests was 
unlikely to be accepted as a reasonable restraint of trade. Instead, the NCAA 
framed television and football broadcasting as a technological threat not only 
to colleges but also to the nation. Television, according to the NCAA, created 
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a “free ticket” that drew fans away from the stadium. The football programs of 
small colleges would become vulnerable in a market dominated by a “TV aris-
tocracy”79 where fans enjoy football from the comfort of their own homes. The 
vulnerability of small schools is of national concern, the NCAA argued, since 
they form the foundation of the U.S.’s system of higher education.80 The NCAA 
further claimed that football funds physical education and intramural athletics, 
so the loss of football revenues would curtail the physical training of the na-
tion’s business and military leaders81—harkening to both prongs of containment. 
Furthermore, attending football games historically has been a component of the 
college experience and therefore part of the American way of life.82 The NCAA 
did not simply frame television as a threat to schools that had grown accustomed 
to profiting from the business of college football; it framed television as a threat 
to the nation and the American way of life. This frame suggested that televi-
sion’s technological threat would increase centralization and impede America’s 
ability to wage the Cold War by undermining the masculinity of its youth. The 
NCAA’s emotion-laden appeal at a time of geopolitical struggle could make a 
mere restraint of trade seem quite reasonable.
 The framing of NCAA broadcast regulations did not suddenly spring forth in 
1951. Looking closely at the reports of the Television Steering Committee dem-
onstrate that it crystallized over a period of years even though important aspects 
were in place at the beginning. Annual reports show a narrowing and clarifying 
of the frame by subsequent steering committees. Framing the regulations was 
not simply a response to the concerns of the state and civil society, the frames 
also responded to NCAA member institutions, the networks, and sponsors. 
 The new economic conditions of the television age and the cultural conditions 
of the Cold War allowed the NCAA to remake itself as a regulatory agency with 
the power to police its members. A range of possible responses to the challenge 
of television lay before the NCAA. The NCAA neither embraced nor rejected 
television; instead it decided to contain it. The NCAA’s strategy of television 
containment began in 1951 when member institutions voted to regulate football 
broadcasting by calling for a moratorium—though critics saw it as a ban—on 
broadcasting to “test the effects” of television on gate receipts.83 The moratorium 
was the NCAA’s first step towards becoming an actual cartel.84 The defining 
term of NCAA containment was “limit”: limit the number of broadcasts and 
limit schools’ broadcast appearances.85 The regulations also made the NCAA 
television committee a clearinghouse that the networks and colleges had to work 
through when setting broadcast schedules. The television committee also asked 
for 18 percent of the royalties from the 1951 season.86 
NCAA Broadcast Policy Formation
 Creating broadcast regulations was a three-step process. The first step was 
negotiating with the myriad, competing parties involved in college football 
broadcasting in order to win their support for the NCAA regulations.87 Therefore, 
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the NCAA took advice and counsel from, “networks, stations, TV set manufac-
turers, pay-as-you-see TV companies, advertising agencies, sponsors, press, TV 
committee consultants, delegates from conferences, [and] representatives of 
various areas”88 to formulate its policy.89 NCAA broadcast policy was written to 
bring the varying competing interests necessary for broadcasting into a coalition. 
The financial and publicity benefits of football broadcasting were inequitably 
distributed amongst coalition members in favor of top football schools despite 
the NCAA’s emphasis on revenue sharing.90
 The written policy was then pitched to the association itself. Member institu-
tions, including the ones that had participated in its formation, ratified the policy 
at the annual NCAA conventions to which the television committee reports were 
presented. The reports were an important tool for wining support for the policy by 
informing the coalition about the current state of college football from a NCAA 
perspective.91 The reports framed television as an eternal financial threat upon 
college athletics that only the television committee could effectively contain. The 
reports maintained this position even after 1956 when college football embarked 
upon decades of stable financial growth. The reports suggested that the NCAA’s 
supra-institutional position allowed it to provide the solution to television because 
it acted on behalf of all of the schools without bias. The reports went on to stress 
that the NCAA formed its policy through study of the trends in both broadcasting 
and stadium attendance made available by the NORC reports. The policy also 
served the greatest number of parties, albeit imperfectly for everyone, because 
of the democratic participation of a representative sampling of the individuals 
and the institutions with vested interests in college football broadcasting. And 
lastly, the reports claimed that the policy protected the many small schools that 
felt more embattled than ever by the emergence of television and that made up 
a majority of the NCAA membership. 
 Many NCAA members felt that television accentuated the already inequi-
table distribution of football revenues that had produced an elite tier of winning 
teams. The early NCAA television committee reports spoke to the fears of small 
schools when they described, under the subheading of “commercialization,” the 
emergence of a “TV aristocracy” that would dominate on-field competition and 
monopolize network revenues. The 1952 report states that although protecting 
the gate is imperative, “there is perhaps an even more disturbing threat to the 
future of intercollegiate football inherent in the premium financial and publicity 
rewards which can be realized from live television.”92 One of the few things that 
the NCAA television committee stated confidently about television was that it 
would eventually generate large sums of money and accentuate the commercial-
ization of college football by producing a TV aristocracy. Even large schools, for 
publicity reasons alone, would support limited measures to maintain competitive 
balance in a structurally unequal environment.93 
 The final step in the process was selling a policy of limited broadcasting to 
a public that desired freedom of choice as consumers. This was a trickier step 
since fans simply wanted to watch the game of their choice whereas members 
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of the broadcast coalition from schools to networks to advertisers had a com-
mon interest in stable capital accumulation. As a result, fans and sports writers 
reacted critically to the NCAA’s limited broadcast schedules.94 Responding to 
criticism in the media, the NCAA undertook a program to “correctly inform” the 
public on controlled broadcasting in order to shape public opinion in favor of its 
limited broadcast schedule. The article “Why Football on TV is Limited” by Asa 
Bushnell, NCAA director of television programming and secretary of the U.S. 
Olympic Committee, is an example of how the NCAA responded to consumer 
dissatisfaction.95 Bushnell defends the NCAA’s policy of limiting broadcasts to 
one game per week against fans’ apparent desire for free market conditions by 
describing the NCAA as the steward of college football that saved it in 1905. 
Bushnell argued that fans’ unrestrained desire for free football would have “cata-
strophic” effects upon college football that funds all other inter-collegiate and 
intramural athletics. Therefore, protecting gate revenues against television and 
evenly extending televisual representation to all regions and schools regardless 
of size best serves the public interest.96 The connections that Bushnell draws 
between football, revenue flows, masculinity, and public interest highlight the 
NCAA’s framing of television broadcasting, discussed below, and resurfaces 
decades later in title IX debates.97
 The NCAA disseminated publicity by a variety of means. One of the stated 
criteria for selecting a network was its willingness to aggressively promote 
the NCAA. The television committee instituted a “liaison officer” in 1953 that 
interfaced with the contracting network to ensure clear, consistent, and broad 
dissemination of NCAA publicity. While the liaison officer dedicated time to 
producing content like the “Will-To-Win” packages, his primary charge was 
organizing an array of publicity channels to educate the public. This included 
press kits, pre-game and post-game packages, newspaper ads and articles, radio 
interviews and spots, and talks given to special groups, “such as Sportswriters 
and Sportscasters associations, [and] college booster and alumni clubs.”98 The 
messages focused on how NCAA regulations serve a public interest that was 
defined in line with broader cultural tendencies of the early Cold War. 
Football As Remedy For Depleted Masculinity
 The NCAA needed to develop a clear frame in order to present its vision 
as reasonable. NCAA reports described fans’ desire to watch the game of their 
choice for free without enduring weather conditions, crowds, or parking as a threat 
to inter-collegiate athletics since football financially supported all other athletic 
programs. Whether college football actually benefited other athletic programs or 
not is open to question,99 and it was questioned in the 1950s.100 Nevertheless, the 
NCAA held football’s economic beneficence as axiomatic. The NCAA reasoned 
that since football funds all other athletic programs, any challenge to football’s 
preeminence on college campuses would curtail other sports. And a reduction in 
intercollegiate and intramural athletics would jeopardize the physical training of 
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U.S. youth at a time of international crisis.101 Therefore, to protect football was 
to protect the nation at large.
 The success of the Soviet Union at the summer Olympics beginning with 
the Helsinki games in 1952 added urgency to the NCAA’s claim.102 Critics 
claimed that the Soviet Union was using the Olympics to wage the Cold War in 
a cultural sphere. The United States responded by turning its universities into a 
training ground for preparing athletes to meet the Kremlin on a global stage of 
Cold War athletics.103 The use of university athletics provided a liberal strategy 
for harnessing the nation’s resources during the cultural Cold War by outsourcing 
athletic production to “non-state” institutions.104 But university athletics played 
a larger role than just preparing elite athletes for Olympic competition. John T. 
McGovern, a U.S. Olympic official, clarified the larger purpose of U.S. Olym-
pic performance: “[T]he most important thing of all is to impress on our young 
people the soundness of constant training and conditioning.”105 This suggests 
that university athletics were a site for waging the Cold War and young people’s 
bodies were weapons in the geopolitical struggle.106
 Concern over the declining physical fitness of U.S. bodies reached a height-
ened pitch during the 1950s. Fear that the bodies of U.S. youth were growing soft 
and flabby in relation to Soviet bodies was named the “muscle gap” in 1954 fol-
lowing the publication of the Kraus-Weber Minimal Fitness Tests and the release 
of Korean War draft rejection rates.107 Muscle gap fears claimed European youth 
were more physically fit than U.S. youth and that the development of physical 
education programs was necessary to close the gap. Muscle gap fears intensi-
fied after Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in 1955; the Soviet Union launched 
Sputnik in 1957 and continued to show Olympic success; and peaked in the early 
1960s when Kennedy wrapped his presidency in muscle gap rhetoric.108
 The muscle gap was part of a larger “crisis of masculinity” during the 1950s 
manifested in the language of mass culture critiques. At the heart of the crisis 
was a concern that modern society had an effeminizing effect upon men and 
that was leading to the replacement of “traditional” masculine characteristics of 
rugged independence for the passive conformism of the companionate family 
and large corporation.109 Despite having a vested interest in becoming a large, 
controlling institution through the establishment of its broadcast regulations, the 
NCAA found great cultural resonance with the claim that college football was a 
part of the national mission at a time of widespread concern over men’s physi-
cal development. Rear Admiral Tom Hamilton, chairman of the 1951 Television 
Steering Committee, attempted to cultivate that link when he claimed that football 
broadcasting created a “perplexing problem, which threatens the maintenance of 
our national physical training and competitive sports programs . . . .”110 Along 
with Ralph Furey, co-chairman of the 1952 steering committee, Hamilton reiter-
ated the connection between broadcast regulations and the physical development 
of the nation’s youth. “As the sports public comes to understand the issues [via 
NCAA publicity], it will recognize the NCAA efforts in this field as the best and 
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only means of protecting the physical well-being and physical development of 
the sons and daughters of the nation.”111
 The NCAA continued to cultivate that link in its publicity campaigns by 
arguing college football supported a broad array of athletic programs neces-
sary for supporting national fitness programs. Robert Hall, former Yale athletic 
director and NCAA Television Steering Committee Chairman in 1955, argued 
in Sports Illustrated that television would siphon off gate receipts from small 
schools causing them to divert money from intramurals to support their football 
teams. Curtailing intramurals is a problem, Hall reasoned, since “[l]ack of ad-
equate exercise is deemed at least partly responsible for the increasing number 
of rejections for physical reasons by the armed forces.”112 By 1955 the NCAA 
had refined its frame into a 7-point plan intended to structure all NCAA public-
ity. The plan emphasized public interest and the traditional role of athletics in 
college education:
1. College football is a character-building activity which 
performs an essential and worthwhile function in the 
over-all academic life of the student.
2. Intercollegiate sports competition aids in the development 
of the youth of our nation and prepares them for positions 
as future national leaders.
3. The 1955 Plan as devised offers the American public a 
true cross-section of collegiate football and at the same 
time protects the athletic budgets of member colleges.
4. Intercollegiate competition—
a. develops will-to-win;
b. teaches self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and self-control;
c. builds sound minds and bodies through mental and 
physical training and coordination;
d. develops a spirit of loyalty and team-work which 
is the foundation of success in American industry, 
government, and the military.
5. Small colleges have important sports programs, and their 
football produces keen, close competition.
6. Good attendance at college football games throughout the 
nation each Saturday will support the year-round campus 
sports program.
7. College football is the original football; it is great foot-
ball.113
 A clear though complicated image arises from the NCAA’s framing of 
college football. First, it suggests that football serves an important academic 
function in cultivating desirable characteristics in (male) citizens that includes 
the desire to work as a team to dominate others while remaining loyal to author-
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ity,114 the development of a hard body and mind, and the ambition to lead peers. 
Second, college football as both a local and national practice represents the many 
diverse regions of the nation. For instance, the September 30, 1961 halftime 
program titled, “All-American sport for all Americans” suggested that college 
football creates a cultural sphere that brings the diversity of the nation together 
in pluralistic harmony.115 This makes football a pluralistic representation of the 
nation that allows fans to experience what Homi Bhabha calls the “double-time” 
of nationalism,116 in which fans are simultaneously pedagogical objects learn-
ing about the nation, its regions, and its people and are performative subjects 
participating in the “American way of life” by attending college football games 
and watching the limited broadcast schedule. Third, point 6 constructs a sort of 
“consumer citizenship” by suggesting regular attendance at live games sustain 
the nation’s health. The idea of consumer citizenship implies that citizens have 
an obligation to act as responsible consumers by supporting the games of local 
schools. The obligation is based on the assumption that the nation’s health is 
tied to gate receipts because football funds other athletic programs on campus. 
The “spend locally, act nationally” logic of consumer citizenship offers another 
way for citizens, once properly educated, to become performative subjects of 
the nation. My second and third points highlight the active, participatory nature 
of sports fandom. Not only does fandom produce football, participation in the 
American way of life simultaneously produces the nation and a fan’s position 
in it. Fourth, point 7 brands college football as original and authentic in opposi-
tion to its primary economic rival, the National Football League.117 When put 
together the NCAA constructs football as a tradition of college life that expresses 
national spirit and produces masculine Cold War citizens who will participate 
in the nation as active consumers. All seven points of the plan are expressed in 
the text of a 1956 halftime message:
The Army-Navy game, perhaps the most colorful of the hun-
dreds of contests making up the intercollegiate football sched-
ule each autumn, illustrates graphically the many fine features 
of this greatest of all contact sports. Similarly college football 
accurately characterizes the diversified competitive athletic 
program which the NCAA and its member institutions from 
coast to coast consider indispensable if on-campus training of 
the country’s youth is to be complete, comprehensive, and ef-
fectively preparatory for the future. Collegiate football does not 
need the de-emphasis sometimes suggested for it; but it should 
not be handicapped by over-emphasis. The correct treatment 
of collegiate football is its continuing strong emphasis as a 
worthwhile ingredient of the nation’s educational process.118
 Eventually the NCAA believed that its publicity swung the public in its 
favor. The 1958 report stated, “Although there are indicators that the public 
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would like to see the game of its own choice, the development of understanding 
by the public has resulted in an acceptance of a controlled program.”119 College 
football broadcast ratings consistently grew throughout the following decades.120 
As college football broadcasting experienced steady economic growth, fans 
became acclimated to the NCAA’s controls and limitations on consumer choice. 
But before realizing that growth, the NCAA needed to quell internal challenges 
to its cartel.
Policing the Coalition—Penn’s Revolt
 The strongest challenge to NCAA regulations came from a NCAA-member 
institution. Ingham, Howell, and Schilperoort argue that a cartel functions ef-
fectively when member firms stick to collusive agreements that are based on 
mutual interest. However, if a member firm sees greater interest as an individual 
agent outside of the cartel then they are likely to bolt and the cartel must act to 
discipline the transgressor or risk disintegration.121 This is an important point for 
both the NCAA that enjoyed new authority following the recent setback of the 
Sanity Code122 and for schools that could negotiate lucrative television contracts 
individually. Notre Dame chafed under NCAA controls since it had the most 
to gain from Home Rule. However, Notre Dame bided its time and let Penn di-
rectly challenged NCAA authority.123 Flouting the NCAA’s policy of controlled 
broadcasting, Penn struck a deal with ABC worth $250,000 to televise its 1951 
season.124 The NCAA reacted by ruling that no NCAA school could play Penn as 
long as it acted outside of the cartel. Ultimately, Penn backed down and agreed 
to work with the Television Steering Committee in scheduling its broadcasts.
 The rift between the NCAA and Penn lasted for three years and served as a 
warning to schools wishing to break broadcast containment.125 The NCAA ex-
erted direct, disciplinary force by blocking Penn’s broadcasts and attempting to 
bar its athletes from events like the prestigious Ohio Regatta.126 But the NCAA 
also acted more in line with the conditions of the early Cold War than did Penn. 
The NCAA did not frame its regulations as a restraint of supply that artificially 
inflates value, but positioned its policies as steps to protect public interest by 
defending small schools and their overall athletic mission to fortify masculinity 
in the nation. The NCAA successfully framed uncontained broadcasting as a 
technological threat to the nation’s human resources that would lead to greater 
centralization of wealth in large institutions. It also situated its regulations as a 
bulwark of defense against that attack. With the NCAA framing its regulations 
as protecting youth and small colleges, Penn’s actions appeared as crass egoism 
in the conformist 1950s despite its adherence to the NCAA’s tradition of insti-
tutional autonomy. Arthur Daley of the New York Times chided Penn’s actions 
as poor behavior from a school associated with Ivy League respectability rather 
than public school ambition.127 Critics berated Penn’s president, Harold Stassen, 
for his ambitions in football and politics. One critic wrote to Penn’s Board of 
Trustees that, “Mr. Stassen is having difficulty subduing his political tendencies 
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and wishes to ingratiate himself with the Roman Catholics [Notre Dame].”128 The 
success of the NCAA’s frame was tied to a general tendency during the early Cold 
War to suppress individual liberty in favor of order and consensus. This tendency 
was driven by cold war anxiety and referred to as the “liberal consensus.”129 
 NCAA broadcast regulations were more consistent with what David Harvey 
(1990) refers to as Postwar Fordism than the entrepreneurial strategy of Penn. 
Fordism was a logical development of Corporate Liberalism that involves a 
high degree of corporate regulation of both the economy and society. It relied 
on a tripartite pact struck between big business, big labor, and big government. 
Although Fordism’s flowering was contained early in the century, it blossomed 
following the success of centralized planning during World War II, the rise of 
cold war unity against communism, and the establishment of new regulatory 
schemes for government.130 Fordism ensured the formation of a disciplined 
workforce compensated in rising wages and increased leisure time that was the 
foundation of the American way of life in addition to consolidating capital in 
enormous corporations and increasing the nation’s productive capacities.131
 The state did not formally question the NCAA’s collusive and restrictive 
regulations until the 1980s. In fact, the NCAA felt emboldened in 1953 by the 
United States v National Football League (U.S. v NFL) decision that upheld the 
right of a league to limit broadcasts as a measure to protect attendance, especially 
of smaller institutions.132 Judge J. Grim stated in his decision that the overriding 
public interest is healthy market competition. “The purposes of the Sherman 
Act certainly will not be served by prohibiting the defendant clubs, particularly 
the weaker clubs, from protecting their home gate receipts from the disastrous 
financial effects of invading telecasts of outside games.”133 Given the overriding 
interest of supporting commerce, Judge Grim further reasoned that, “The League 
is truly a unique business enterprise, which is entitled to protect its very existence 
by agreeing to reasonable restrictions on its member clubs.”134 In U.S. v NFL, 
the court saw protective regulations that fostered stable capital accumulation as 
reasonable restraints upon trade. Despite being a ruling on professional football, 
the NCAA, correctly, believed that U.S. v NFL would shield its regulations from 
legal or political scrutiny. The NCAA further claimed congressional support 
of its regulations in 1961 when the House blocked both live and tape-delayed 
broadcasts of professional games on Friday evenings and Saturdays during the 
college football season.135 The House Committee on the Judiciary explained it 
acted so that, “college football, upon which substantial educational programs 
depend for revenue, is not unduly prejudiced.”136 In both instances, we see state 
acceptance of regulations that limit competition as serving public interest in 
order to stabilize market chaos and foster conditions for predictable capital ac-
cumulation.
 Originally drafted as a defensive measure to contain television’s technologi-
cal invasion, the NCAA plan provided a stable environment for predictable capital 
accumulation. The first step in building a robust economic model was the NCAA’s 
effective cartelization of athletics and selling its restrictions as reasonable. The 
A Cartel in the Public Interest  173
final step was the establishment of an effective sponsorship model. From 1951 
to 1953 the NCAA contracted with a single, large sponsor that could afford and 
benefit from national advertising. The NCAA, however, lost General Motors 
(GM) as its sole sponsor when switching from NBC to ABC in 1954. Unable 
to find a replacement for GM, the NCAA was forced to cobble together a group 
of smaller companies interested in regional advertising. It turned out, however, 
that using several smaller sponsors and a regional marketing strategy lowered 
the cost to individual advertisers while increasing the pool of potential sponsors. 
The regional marketing model also matched the regional broadcast model that the 
Big Ten and Pacific Coast Conference successfully pushed through in 1955 over 
the resistance of many small and Southern schools.137 NCAA regulations coupled 
with a multi-sponsor model set the conditions for accruing significant financial 
revenues from football broadcasting at the same time that stadium attendance 
was reaching new highs. The NCAA began to embrace television when it real-
ized that college football and broadcasting could form a symbiotic relationship; 
what Sut Jhally calls the “sport/media complex” where sport and media become 
economically intertwined.138 When the NCAA embraced television, discussion of 
commercialization and a TV aristocracy disappeared from the steering commit-
tee’s reports.139 Control over television revenues bought more than just positive 
feelings. Broadcast domination produced enough capital for the NCAA to buy 
support throughout the Cold War and discipline wayward schools like Penn.140
Neoliberalism and the End of NCAA Regulations
 Football broadcasting generated ever-growing revenues throughout the Cold 
War. In 1951 the NCAA sold its broadcast rights for $679,800; $3.1 million in 
1961; $12 million in 1971; and $31 million in 1981.141 It brought thirty years 
of rapid growth that more than doubled between 1971 and 1981 (see Figure 1). 
However, controlling for inflation modifies the image of consistent financial 
growth with the greatest gain achieved between 1971 and 1981. 
 Standardizing the contracts at their dollar value in 2005 controls inflation. 
The value of the 1951 contract in 2005 is $5.2 million, the 1961 contract $19.5 
million, the 1971 contract $57.1 million, and the 1981 contract $69.3 million.142 
Football broadcasting was not of significant, immediate value to the NCAA or 
most NCAA member institutions in 1952, yet its value increased by over 13 fold 
in just 30 years (see Figure 2). But most of that increase occurred in the first 20 
years with the greatest increase in value coming between 1961 and 1971. Despite 
the largest growth in raw dollars between 1971 and 1981, the period saw only 
an 18 percent increase in value—the least of any period. The 1970s, of course, 
saw high levels of inflation and transformations in the political economy of the 
United States. Broader changes in U.S. society were likely to trigger a reaction 
within the competitive world of college football.
 Dissatisfaction from within the NCAA over the diminishing flow of broad-
cast revenues triggered a new challenge upon the NCAA’s cartel. Sixty-two 
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Figure 1 - NCAA Broadcast Contracts, 1951-1981
$3,125,000
$12,000,000
$31,000,000
$679,800
$0
$5,000,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$20,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
$35,000,000
1951 1961 1971 1981
Dollar Amount of Contract
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Figure 2 - NCAA Broadcast Revenues vs. Value in 2005
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Figure 2: Andrew Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, p. 95.
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elite football schools formed the College Football Association (CFA) in 1977 in 
order to challenge the NCAA’s controls and gain a larger proportion of broadcast 
revenues. Members of the CFA felt that the enforced limitations of the NCAA 
system hindered their television appearances and profits. The NCAA responded 
to the CFA’s challenge by liberalizing its broadcast regulations. In 1982 the 
NCAA contracted with three networks (ABC, CBS, and TBS). Unlike the single 
network contract of the previous thirty years, the multi-network contract signifi-
cantly increased broadcast content. The rewards were large (see Figure 3). The 
NCAA and its member institutions were rewarded for the more liberal broadcast 
schedule with a $64.8 million contract (worth $131.4 million in 2005 dollars). 
The multi-network contract demonstrated that the days of limited broadcasting 
and protectionism were coming to an end. 
 The CFA was not satisfied by the NCAA’s concession and continued its 
challenge. The multi-network contract gave CFA members much of what they 
wanted; top football schools saw both their television appearances and revenues 
increase. The multi-network contract, however was only a step in the direction 
toward which capitalism was moving and that top schools like Oklahoma wanted 
to follow.143 David Harvey (1990) argues that by the mid-1970s the rigidity of 
Fordism limited its ability to respond to and profit from growing consumer mar-
kets.144 Capital then reconfigured as Neoliberalism, which is characterized by 
an emphasis on market-based competition, deregulation, privatization, cutting 
public expenditures, and replacing a concept of “public good” for “individual 
responsibility.”145 Released from Fordist regulations and by harnessing new 
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technologies, the new economy capitalizes on consumer markets by providing 
individualized commodities to niche markets in globalized systems of produc-
tion, marketing, and distribution without sacrificing economic efficiency.146 
 Neoliberalism describes not only the political economy of capitalism but 
also the cultural conditions of U.S. society. The muscle gap was quickly forgotten 
following John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963 and the breakup of the liberal 
consensus in 1964.147 With the breakup of the liberal consensus, self-sacrifice 
for the state gave way to a new individualism. For instance, the counter-culture 
movement re-imagined exercise and fitness not as an individual’s obligation to 
society embodied in the nation-state but as an ethic of self-improvement and care 
of self. The United States also experienced decades of success at the summer 
Olympics in a variety of sports. So even though constructions of masculinity 
remained central to football as well as a Reagan-era crisis of masculinity that 
celebrated violence and hard-bodies, the relationship between collegiate athlet-
ics, masculinity, and public interest did not resonate as it had in the 1950s. The 
fit body in the 1980s signified personal responsibility as the citizen’s social 
obligation to care for self, and exercise increasingly moved from high school 
gyms and YMCA’s into the commoditized space of commercial gyms.148 The re-
imagining of consumer citizenship that took place by the mid-1980s undermined 
the NCAA’s ability to claim its regulations served the public interest.
 The CFA’s challenge against the NCAA ultimately led to the landmark 1984 
case NCAA v Board of Regents in which the Supreme Court de-regulated college 
football broadcasting and ended the NCAA’s broadcast cartel.149 Unlike the 1950s 
when the NCAA’s restraint of trade appeared reasonable, in 1984 the court voted 
7 to 2 against NCAA regulations. The reasoning of the court in NCAA v Board of 
Regents highlights the reconfiguration of capital and the new cultural conditions 
of neoliberalism.150 In the majority decision, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
the court focused primarily on competition, the quantity of available broadcast 
content (output), and consumer choice.151 The court reasoned that free competition 
leads to quantitative increases in broadcast content; increased output provides 
the greatest consumer choice to the networks and fans. Restricting competition 
decreases output, artificially raises prices, and limits choice.152 Consistent with 
the logic of neoliberalism, the court saw the market as the best mechanism to 
serve the public interest since it maximized consumer satisfaction.153 Given the 
rise of cable television in the 1980s, the court held that deregulation would not 
just increase output but also increase regional content tailored to local, niche 
markets.154
 The NCAA’s defense in the case made two key points that echoed claims 
made in the 1950s. First, the NCAA argued that unregulated broadcasting would 
threaten live attendance. Second, regulated broadcasting allowed the NCAA to 
spread television revenues evenly amongst NCAA schools. The court rejected 
both points. On the first point, the court doubted the NCAA’s claim that live 
broadcasting threatened stadium attendance despite the NORC findings from 
the 1950s.155 More importantly, the court found the NCAA’s protectionist strat-
A Cartel in the Public Interest  177
egy (i.e. protecting ticket sales from competition with television broadcasts) 
as incompatible with the Sherman Act and, hence, an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.156 Instead, the court saw maximizing market competition as the means to 
increase consumer satisfaction. As Zimbalist writes, “The relevant datum [to the 
court] was not whether or not fewer people were in attendance, but whether the 
sum of fans in attendance plus fans watching on television would be greater if 
the TV restrictions were lifted.”157 The court rejected the second point because 
it doubted the efficacy of NCAA revenue sharing. Instead of working as a “pro-
competitive” control, the NCAA plan limits one source of revenue among many 
other available sources, a source that is more important to some schools than 
others.158 The court viewed this as punishing top schools in order to boost less 
competitive schools. The court’s logic in 1984 proved different from attitudes 
in the 1950s. 
 Former All-American, Justice Byron “Whizzer” White wrote a dissenting 
position that further highlights changes in reasoning. White was disappointed 
that the court overlooked non-economic factors in its decision. White affirmed 
the NCAA’s claim that regulations reduced incentives to win and therefore 
fostered a climate more amendable to education.159 At the heart of his dissent, 
White criticizes the court’s decision to privilege the choice of individuals as a 
measure of public interest over group equity. Specifically, deregulation increases 
the liberty of schools and networks to negotiate and contract with each other; a 
condition constrained by NCAA regulations.160 White argues the NCAA Plan does 
in fact suppress the broadcast revenues going to top schools in order to inflate 
the revenues small schools receive. However, this more equitable distribution of 
resources within college football is a cost of doing business within the NCAA. 
Membership in the NCAA, White contends, adds value to all schools so revenue 
sharing is a legitimate cost for accruing the benefits of league membership.161 
Unlike White’s position that large schools have a greater obligation to pay into 
the system since they accrue greater rewards from the system, the general trend of 
neoliberalism alleviates corporations from their financial obligation to society.162 
White’s dissent was prescient by arguing deregulation would further benefit elite 
schools by giving them more television exposure and an even greater share of 
broadcast revenues.163 Unlike 1950s rhetoric that constructed protectionist strate-
gies as a necessary defense against outside invasion, the 1984 decision opened 
up the gates of unconstrained competition and commercialism by turning to the 
free market as the mechanism for fulfilling the desires of as many individual 
consumers as possible.164 
Conclusion—Liberty and the Pursuit of Profit
 The shifting terrain of U.S. liberalism has profoundly affected college 
football. The social conditions of the Progressive Era that made Corporate 
Liberalism possible also gave birth to the NCAA. The social conditions of the 
early Cold War that led to the emergence of Fordism also made the carteliza-
178  Jeffrey Montez de Oca
tion of football broadcasting appear to serve the public interest. Neoliberalism 
superseded Fordism and embarked upon a process of deregulation in order to 
maximize the economic power of the market and support individual profit. 
Neoliberalism, despite harkening to “classical liberalism,” only exacerbates the 
centralization of power in large corporations initiated by Corporate Liberalism.165 
The hoarding of broadcast revenues by top tier football schools to the detriment 
of smaller programs has borne this out in the deregulated era of college football 
broadcasting.166 Capitalist development during the twentieth century is clearly 
written onto the pages of college football history.
 It took thirty-three years before the Supreme Court agreed with Notre Dame 
that NCAA regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade and returned Home 
Rule to football broadcasting.167 This shift in reason did not occur in isolation 
from broader social, political, and economic transformations. Notre Dame, during 
the periods under consideration, has proven itself a highly ambitious institution 
that used football as an effective part of its strategy to grow from a parochial 
Catholic school into a world-class university.168 Achieving national popularity 
allowed Notre Dame to remain independent from the obligations and costs of 
conference membership that most schools must bear. During the 1950s when it 
had the most to gain from Home Rule, Notre Dame did not directly challenge the 
NCAA’s broadcast regulations. In part challenging regulations was out of step 
with the economic tides of college football and capitalism more generally. At the 
same time, the entrepreneurial actions of a Catholic school in the 1950s would 
have been interpreted even more harshly than were Penn’s.169 After all, Penn was 
a member of the northeastern establishment that dominated the NCAA in the 
1950s.170 In the 1990s, however, changes in the practice of capital accumulation 
as well as the meaning of both public interest and Catholicism allowed Notre 
Dame to realize its broadcast potential without serious repercussion. In 1990, 
Notre Dame left the CFA to sign an exclusive five-year contract with NBC worth 
$35 million.171 Whether by conscious design or not, Notre Dame and the NCAA 
both highlight the efficacy of acting in regards to broader economic and cultural 
formations that together structure society.
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